What's allowed in Cuba — and what isn't
Every asset on this atlas sits under two legal regimes at once, and you must satisfy both: Cuban domestic law decides what a foreigner may own or do inside Cuba, and U.S. sanctions law decides what a U.S. person may touch at all. A deal that is legal in Havana can still be a felony in Miami. This page is the plain-English map of both — with primary sources where we have them, and an honest flag where the law is unsettled.
There is no equity lane. No U.S. OFAC general license authorizes a U.S. person to take an ownership stake in a Cuban private business — and the widely-repeated claim that Cuba began letting the diaspora take equity in MIPYMEs in March 2026 could not be verified against primary Cuban law. Both sides point the same way: the only clearly-authorized way for a U.S. person to back a Cuban entrepreneur today is remittance / payment support (via QvaPay), not equity. That is why this site says "support," never "invest."
1 · On the ground in Cuba (Cuban law)
Foreign investment is governed by Law No. 118 of 2014 and its regulation Decreto 325/2018 (MINCEX, marco legal). Cuban law lets foreigners invest — but almost always with the state, in approved projects, never by quietly buying a state asset or a private shop.
- ✓Foreign investment through three forms: a joint venture (empresa mixta), an international economic association contract (AEI), or a wholly-foreign-owned enterprise. (Ley 118)
- ✓In all sectors except health & education for the population and the armed forces (bar their enterprise systems).
- ✓Repatriate profits freely abroad in convertible currency, with no transfer tax.
- ✓Protection from expropriation except declared public-utility, with indemnification at commercial value in convertible currency.
- ✓Up to 100% foreign ownership inside the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED Mariel, Decreto-Ley 313).
- ✓Operate licensed private MIPYMEs (≤100 employees) — now under Decreto-Ley 88/2024.
- ✕Buying a Cuban state asset outright. State-asset deals must be approved by the state (MINCEX → Council of Ministers, or delegated ministry heads per Acuerdo 8732/2019) and fit the Cartera de Oportunidades portfolio.
- ✕Investing in health/education-to-population or the armed forces' sectors.
- ✕Foreigner/diaspora taking direct equity in a private MIPYME — UNVERIFIED. Widely reported (≈March 2026) but not confirmable in primary law. A 2026 migration/investor reform exists (Granma, May 2026); its equity scope is unclear. Treat as counsel-required.
- ✕Routing money through the military conglomerate GAESA and its arms (CIMEX, Gaviota, FINCIMEX, Almacenes Universales) — which control ports, tourism, retail and the remittance rails.
2 · The U.S. side (sanctions law)
The embargo baseline is the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515): for a U.S. person, transactions with Cuba are prohibited unless authorized, and §515.201(c) independently bans structuring around the rules. A narrow set of general licenses opens a private-sector lane.
- ✓Remittances & payments to Cuban nationals and independent private entrepreneurs (§515.570).
- ✓Importing goods & services from independent private sector entrepreneurs — §515.582, using the §515.340 ≤100-employee / non-regime test. (Fed. Reg. 2024-11618)
- ✓Internet-based services (§515.578) and telecom/payment platforms (§515.542).
- ✓U.S. bank accounts opened solely in the name of a Cuban independent private entrepreneur (§515.584(h), new in 2024).
- ✕Equity in any Cuban enterprise. No general license authorizes it — it would need a specific OFAC license.
- ✕Any transaction with GAESA / Restricted-List / SDN entities. GAESA has been SDN + Restricted-List since Dec 2020 and was re-designated under EO 14404 (May 7 2026). (OFAC FAQ)
- ✕Lodging at a Prohibited Accommodations List hotel; any confiscated-property nexus → Helms-Burton Title III treble-damages liability, broadened by Havana Docks (May 21 2026); Title IV visa bars.
- ✕Payments or inducements to Cuban officials — FCPA plus sanctions exposure.
The general licenses that open the lane
What changed in 2025–2026
- 2020-12-21GAESA originally placed on the SDN List and Cuba Restricted List
- 2024-05-29CACR amendments effective — 515.340 redefines 'independent private sector entrepreneur'; expanded private-sector general licenses
- 2026-03-18Cuba rule change allowing diaspora/foreign equity in MIPYMEs (private SMEs); formalized via Official Gazette package published May 5, 2026
- 2026-05-01EO 14404 signed — expanded IEEPA-based Cuba sanctions and secondary-sanctions authority
- 2026-05-07First EO 14404 designations: GAESA, Moa Nickel S.A., Ania Guillermina Lastres Morera
- 2026-05-18Second tranche: MININT, PNR, DGI and eleven senior officials (incl. Rodriguez Lopez-Calleja, Rosabel Gamon Verde)
- 2026-05-21SCOTUS Havana Docks ruling (8-1, Thomas, J.) broadened Title III Helms-Burton trafficking liability for use of confiscated Cuban property
- 2026-06-04Third tranche: MINFAR, Minera La Victoria, CDR, ICAP/Amistur, Diaz-Canel and Lis Cuesta Peraza, Alejandro Castro Espin
- 2026-06-05GAESA foreign-person wind-down deadline (OFAC limited non-targeting posture ends)
3 · The only lane today
Put the two regimes together and one path survives: support the licensed independent private sector through OFAC-authorized remittances and payments, routed via QvaPay, to entrepreneurs who pass a KYC + OFAC-SDN screen as independent private entities of ≤100 employees — with settlement that never touches GAESA, FINCIMEX, or a Cuban state bank, and no confiscated-property nexus. Not equity, not state assets, no regime counterparties. See how support works and the compliance posture.
- • Whether Cuban law actually permits foreign/diaspora equity in MIPYMEs (unverified).
- • How EO 14404's IEEPA program and secondary-sanctions reach interact with the CACR private-sector GLs.
- • Helms-Burton Title III exposure for any asset with a confiscation history after Havana Docks.
- • Securities-law treatment of any pooled vehicle, even one limited to remittance/payment support.
Confidence: Cuban-law and core OFAC statements above are drawn from primary sources (MINCEX/Ley 118, Gaceta Oficial, Federal Register 2024-11618, OFAC FAQs) and were adversarially verified; Helms-Burton and EO 14404 secondary-effects statements rest on named law-firm analyses and the ingested OFAC corpus and are not individually court-confirmed here. See Data & methodology. This is research, not legal advice — stand up any structure only with OFAC sanctions counsel and securities counsel.