⚠ COMPLIANCENot legal, tax, or investment advice — and not authorization for any transaction. U.S. sanctions (the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515) heavily restrict — and in most cases prohibit — dealings between U.S. persons and Cuba, including any form of investment or equity in a Cuban business. The rules are complex, fact-specific, and change; nothing on this site is a determination that any transaction is lawful. Structure anything Cuba-facing only with qualified OFAC sanctions counsel, and screen every party (names, entities, wallets) with QvaPay Sentinel.Primary sources: OFAC Cuba Sanctions · 31 CFR Part 515 (CACR) · OFAC Cuba FAQs · Cuba Restricted List

The law on the ground

What's allowed in Cuba — and what isn't

Every asset on this atlas sits under two legal regimes at once, and you must satisfy both: U.S. sanctions law decides what a U.S. person may touch at all, and Cuban domestic law decides what a foreigner may own or do inside Cuba. A deal that is legal in Havana can still be a felony in Miami. This page is the plain-English map of both — with primary sources where we have them, and an honest flag where the law is unsettled.

Not legal advice. This page maps the law to its primary sources — the OFAC regulations, the statutes, and the official lists linked below — and an automated monitor checks those sources for changes every week. Sanctions law still turns on specifics and can move between updates; confirm any transaction with qualified OFAC sanctions counsel before acting.

Primary sources — read the law yourself

OFAC Cuba Sanctions OFAC Cuba FAQs CACR — 31 CFR Part 515 Cuba Restricted List Prohibited Accommodations List Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD Act)Cuba Foreign Investment Law (Law 118)NSPM-5 (2025)

The finding that shapes everything

There is no equity lane for U.S. persons. No U.S. OFAC general license authorizes a U.S. person to take an ownership stake in a Cuban enterprise — full stop. Cuba's own law is now moving the other way: the June 2026 reform package (~176 measures) formally opens foreign and diaspora equity on the Cuban side (see Reform Watch). But that changes nothing on the U.S. side — until OFAC issues an equity license, the clearly framed path for a U.S. person to back a Cuban entrepreneur is remittance / payment support under the applicable CACR rules (notably §515.570(g)(3)), often via a sanctions-aware rail such as QvaPay — not equity, and not a determination that any specific transfer is authorized. That is why this site says "support," never "invest."

And the support lane narrowed in 2025

The support lane — remittance and payment support to independent entrepreneurs under scoped CACR rules — is narrow and conditional, not a green light. Trump's NSPM-5 (June 30, 2025) reissued the hard-line Cuba policy: it reaffirmed the statutory tourism ban, directed OFAC to tighten the CACR, and directed OFAC to broaden the definition of "prohibited Government of Cuba officials" (§515.337) — which would shrink who qualifies as a genuinely independent entrepreneur. The Biden-era private-sector general licenses remain in effect only until OFAC amends the regulations, so treat the lane as subject to change. Every recipient must be screened as genuinely independent — not a prohibited official or Communist Party member — and settlement must avoid GAESA and the state entirely.

And a secondary-sanctions layer arrived in 2026

On May 1, 2026, Executive Order 14404 (91 FR 25061) added an IEEPA-based Cuba sanctions program on top of the CACR. It authorizes blocking foreign persons who operate in Cuba's energy, defense, metals-and-mining, financial-services, or security sectors, who are owned or controlled by the Government of Cuba, or who materially support blocked persons — and its Section 4 authorizes secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions for blocked persons. Through 2026, OFAC and the State Department designated a cascade of regime entities and officials under this authority.

What this means for the support lane: EO 14404 expressly preserves CACR-authorized activity — Section 2(b) says its blocking authority “shall not apply to activities authorized by… any license issued pursuant to part 515.” So the private-sector general licenses survive — §515.570 remittances (incl. (g)(3)), §515.582 import-tied payments, and §515.584(h)(2) entrepreneur accounts. (§515.584(d), the U-turn authorization, is a bank-clearing rule for transfers between non-U.S. parties, not part of this lane — see below.) What changed is the danger zone around them: the pool of blocked Cuban persons expanded sharply, and a payment that reaches a designated person — or a foreign bank that facilitates one — is now exposed. Steering clear means screening every party against the expanded designations and keeping the recipient a genuinely independent private-sector entrepreneur — never a designated, state, GAESA/MININT/MINFAR, or 50%+-blocked-owned counterparty (OFAC's 50 Percent Rule). Screen with QvaPay Sentinel and structure with OFAC counsel.

Go deeper

Cuban Law 118 process — for non-U.S. / post-sanctions capital →

The full Law 118 process under Cuban domestic law (not an OFAC equity lane for U.S. persons): approval stages, vehicles, capital, tax & labor, Mariel fast-track.

1 · The U.S. side (sanctions law)

The embargo baseline is the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515): for a U.S. person, transactions with Cuba are prohibited unless authorized, and §515.201(c) independently bans structuring around the rules. A narrow set of general licenses opens a private-sector lane.

✓ Authorized for U.S. persons

✓Remittances under §515.570 — including (g)(3) remittances to support private-business development and non-state activity by independent private sector entrepreneurs (§515.340), plus family/donative remittances with their own limits.
✓Importing certain goods & services from independent entrepreneurs — everything except the categories the State Department's §515.582 List excludes — and payments necessary to those imports, with documentary proof of independent status. (Fed. Reg. 2024-11618)
✓Internet-based services (§515.578) and mail/telecommunications transactions (§515.542) — not a general “payment platform” license.
✓U.S. bank accounts opened solely in the name of a Cuban independent private-sector entrepreneur, for authorized transactions (§515.584(h)).
✓“U-turn” transfers — U.S. banks may process Cuba-related transfers that originate and terminate outside the U.S., neither party a U.S. person (§515.584(d), reauthorized 2024). Not a U.S.-person channel to send money to Cuba.

✕ Prohibited for U.S. persons

✕Equity in any Cuban enterprise. No general license authorizes it — it would need a specific OFAC license.
✕Paying a "prohibited" Cuban. The recipient must be a genuinely independent entrepreneur; prohibited Government of Cuba officials (§515.337) and Communist Party members (§515.338) are ineligible — and NSPM-5 (2025) directed OFAC to broaden that class.
✕Any transaction with GAESA / Restricted-List / SDN entities. GAESA has been on the Cuba Restricted List since 2017 and the OFAC SDN List since December 21, 2020.
✕Lodging at a Prohibited Accommodations List hotel; any confiscated-property nexus → Helms-Burton Title III treble-damages liability (Title III suits have been allowed since 2019); Title IV visa bars.
✕Payments or inducements to Cuban officials — FCPA plus sanctions exposure.

2 · On the ground in Cuba (Cuban law)

Foreign investment is governed by Law No. 118 of 2014 and its implementing regulation (MINCEX, marco legal). Cuban law lets foreigners invest — but almost always with the state, in approved projects, never by quietly buying a state asset or a private shop.

✓ Allowed under Cuban law

✓Foreign investment through three forms: a joint venture (empresa mixta), an international economic association contract (AEI), or a wholly-foreign-owned enterprise. (Ley 118)
✓In all sectors except health & education for the population and the armed forces (bar their enterprise systems).
✓Repatriate profits freely abroad in convertible currency, with no transfer tax.
✓Protection from expropriation except declared public-utility, with indemnification at commercial value in convertible currency.
✓Up to 100% foreign ownership inside the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED Mariel).
✓Operate private MIPYMEs (≤100 employees).

✕ Not allowed / unsettled

✕Buying a Cuban state asset outright. State-asset deals must be approved by the state (MINCEX → Council of Ministers, or delegated ministry heads) and fit the Cartera de Oportunidades portfolio.
✕Investing in health/education-to-population or the armed forces' sectors.
✕Foreign/diaspora equity — newly opened, scope settling. The June 2026 reform package (~176 measures) formally allows foreign and diaspora equity in state and large private firms, but the MIPYME-specific scope and mechanics are still being written — and it does not help a U.S. person, who still can't take equity under OFAC. Treat as counsel-required.
✕Routing money through the military conglomerate GAESA and its arms (CIMEX, Gaviota, FINCIMEX, Almacenes Universales) — which control ports, tourism, retail and the remittance rails.

Eligibility definition & authorizing GLs

§515.340 is a definition, not a license. The general licenses below each have a distinct scope — remittances, import-tied payments, internet/telecom, bank accounts. Read the relevance notes; do not fuse them into “pay any MIPYME.”

515.570

Remittances — including, under §515.570(g)(3), remittances to support the development of private businesses in Cuba and operation of non-state economic activity by independent private sector entrepreneurs (§515.340). Family and other donative remittances are also covered, with recipient and source limits.

The core remittance lane for U.S. persons who want to support independent private-sector activity. It is remittance/support-shaped — not a general commercial 'pay any Cuban business' authority, and not equity. Facts, screening, and counsel still decide whether a given transfer fits.

515.340

Not a license — a definition. Defines 'independent private sector entrepreneur' (excludes prohibited Cuban government officials and Communist Party members; caps qualifying private businesses/cooperatives at 100 employees).

Eligibility gate for the private-sector GLs. A MIPYME or its owners must fit this definition; GAESA / Restricted-List / state-controlled counterparties do not.

515.582

Import into the U.S. of certain goods and services produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs — everything except the categories the State Department's Section 515.582 List excludes (the exclusions cover goods only; services carry none) — including payments necessary to those imports, with documentary proof of independent status.

Import-tied only — not a free-standing outbound 'support payments' license. Relevant when a U.S. person is buying eligible (non-excluded) private-sector goods/services; does not by itself authorize every remittance or commercial payment.

515.542

Mail and telecommunications-related transactions and payments involving Cuba — data, telephone, internet connectivity, and related contracts — excluding prohibited officials/Party members.

Telecom and connectivity lane. Does not authorize payment platforms or wallet rails as such; it covers mail/telecom services and payments incident to them.

515.578

Export/reexport to Cuba of certain internet-based communication and supporting services (messaging, hosting, software design, IT/cloud services, e-learning, etc.) and importation of Cuban-origin software.

Internet-services and software lane for digital activity with Cuba. Supports certain IT/cloud/software dealings; it is not a general license to invest in or buy equity in a Cuban fintech.

515.584(h)

U.S. banking institutions may open and maintain accounts solely in the name of a Cuban national who is an independent private sector entrepreneur (§515.340), for conducting transactions authorized or exempt under the CACR.

Bank-account authorization for qualifying independent entrepreneurs — cite this when discussing U.S. accounts, not as a general investment lane.

What changed in 2025–2026

Both regimes are moving fast. Reform Watch tracks the Cuban-side policy in depth — see Reform Watch. The dated milestones below are the ones that change what's legal.

2020-12-21GAESA originally placed on the SDN List and Cuba Restricted List
2024-05-29CACR amendments effective — 515.340 redefines 'independent private sector entrepreneur'; expanded private-sector general licenses
2025-06-30NSPM-5 reissues the Trump-era hard-line Cuba memorandum: escalates pressure on the government, reaffirms the statutory ban on tourism, directs OFAC/Commerce to tighten the CACR, and directs OFAC to broaden the 'prohibited Government of Cuba officials' definition — which would narrow who counts as an eligible independent entrepreneur. Biden-era private-sector general licenses (remittances, U-Turn) remain in effect only until OFAC amends the regulations.
2025-07-14First State Department additions to the Cuba Restricted List and Prohibited Accommodations List under NSPM-5 take effect (more military-linked hotels barred).
2026-03–05Cuban Gazette / implementing measures discussed diaspora and foreign capital in the private economy — MIPYME-specific equity mechanics remain unsettled / counsel-required; does not create a U.S.-person OFAC equity license
2026-06-18National Assembly approves ~176-measure reform package — scraps the state-JV requirement, authorizes private banks, opens foreign/diaspora equity in state & large private firms, lifts the 100-employee cap, allows direct private import/export (Cuban law; does not create a U.S.-person equity license)
2026-07-23State Department E.O. 14404 designations, added to OFAC's SDN list, include Terminal de Contenedores de Mariel S.A. and Coral Marítima S.A. — citing a mid-June 2026 port transfer as GAESA-linked sanctions evasion (OFAC recent actions 2026-07-23).

3 · The only lane today

Put the two regimes together and one framed path survives for U.S. persons: remittance/support to independent private sector entrepreneurs under the applicable CACR rules (notably §515.570(g)(3)), with eligibility under §515.340, SDN/CRL screening, a rail that doesn't run on Cuban state-bank or regime-processor rails, and no confiscated-property nexus — often using a sanctions-aware peer-to-peer rail such as QvaPay, whose independent Cuban forex agents bridge the first/last mile. Not equity, not state assets, not a determination that any transfer is authorized. See how support works, the compliance posture, and the OFAC FAQ on digital entrepreneurs in Cuba (open interpretive questions plus our responses).

Screening the lane

The sanctions screen that runs this — and goes beyond OFAC →

Always screen counterparties against OFAC's SDN list — names, entities and crypto addresses — plus Cuban-regime data pools OFAC has never designated. QvaPay Sentinel — the sanctions & regime screening API.

Open legal questions (get counsel)

• Whether Cuban law actually permits foreign/diaspora equity in MIPYMEs (unverified).
• How the SDN/secondary-sanctions reach on GAESA and state entities interacts with the CACR private-sector GLs.
• Helms-Burton Title III exposure for any asset with a confiscation history.
• Securities-law treatment of any pooled vehicle, even one limited to remittance/payment support.

Confidence: Cuban-law and core OFAC statements above are drawn from primary sources (MINCEX/Ley 118, Gaceta Oficial, Federal Register 2024-11618, OFAC FAQs) and were adversarially verified; Helms-Burton and sanctions secondary-effects statements rest on named law-firm analyses and the ingested OFAC corpus and are not individually court-confirmed here. See Data & methodology. This is research, not legal advice — stand up any structure only with OFAC sanctions counsel and securities counsel.

Common questions

What U.S. laws govern dealings with Cuba?+

Chiefly the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515), enforced by OFAC, and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act (Titles III and IV). Together they broadly prohibit U.S. persons from investing in Cuba.

What is allowed today?+

Scoped CACR authorizations: remittances under §515.570 (including (g)(3) private-sector support), import-tied payments under §515.582, certain travel categories, internet/telecom services, and humanitarian/donative remittances — never equity, and never dealings with Cuba Restricted List entities. Nothing on this site authorizes a specific transfer.

Can a president lift the Cuba embargo?+

Core embargo provisions, including Helms-Burton, were codified by Congress in 1996, so fully lifting the embargo requires Congress. A president can ease or tighten specific regulations within that framework.