What's allowed in Cuba — and what isn't
Every asset on this atlas sits under two legal regimes at once, and you must satisfy both: U.S. sanctions law decides what a U.S. person may touch at all, and Cuban domestic law decides what a foreigner may own or do inside Cuba. A deal that is legal in Havana can still be a felony in Miami. This page is the plain-English map of both — with primary sources where we have them, and an honest flag where the law is unsettled.
Not legal advice. This page maps the law to its primary sources — the OFAC regulations, the statutes, and the official lists linked below — and an automated monitor checks those sources for changes every week. Sanctions law still turns on specifics and can move between updates; confirm any transaction with qualified OFAC sanctions counsel before acting.
There is no equity lane for U.S. persons. No U.S. OFAC general license authorizes a U.S. person to take an ownership stake in a Cuban enterprise — full stop. Cuba's own law is now moving the other way: the June 2026 reform package (~176 measures) formally opens foreign and diaspora equity on the Cuban side (see Reform Watch). But that changes nothing on the U.S. side — until OFAC issues an equity license, the clearly framed path for a U.S. person to back a Cuban entrepreneur is remittance / payment support under the applicable CACR rules (notably §515.570(g)(3)), often via a sanctions-aware rail such as QvaPay — not equity, and not a determination that any specific transfer is authorized. That is why this site says "support," never "invest."
The support lane — remittance and payment support to independent entrepreneurs under scoped CACR rules — is narrow and conditional, not a green light. Trump's NSPM-5 (June 30, 2025) reissued the hard-line Cuba policy: it reaffirmed the statutory tourism ban, directed OFAC to tighten the CACR, and directed OFAC to broaden the definition of "prohibited Government of Cuba officials" (§515.337) — which would shrink who qualifies as a genuinely independent entrepreneur. The Biden-era private-sector general licenses stay in force only as long as OFAC leaves them in place — and OFAC has already amended them once, on September 30, 2026 (below) — so treat the lane as subject to change. Every recipient must be screened as genuinely independent — not a prohibited official or Communist Party member — and settlement must avoid GAESA and the state entirely.
On May 1, 2026, Executive Order 14404 (91 FR 25061) added an IEEPA-based Cuba sanctions program on top of the CACR. It authorizes blocking foreign persons who operate in Cuba's energy, defense, metals-and-mining, financial-services, or security sectors, who are owned or controlled by the Government of Cuba, or who materially support blocked persons — and its Section 4 authorizes secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions for blocked persons. Through 2026, OFAC and the State Department designated a cascade of regime entities and officials under this authority.
What this means for the support lane: EO 14404 expressly preserves CACR-authorized activity — Section 2(b) says its blocking authority “shall not apply to activities authorized by… any license issued pursuant to part 515.” So the private-sector general licenses survive — §515.570 remittances (incl. (g)(3)) and §515.582 import-tied payments. (The §515.584(h)(2) entrepreneur-account license and the §515.584(d) U-turn license did not: OFAC withdrew both effective September 30, 2026 — see the next finding.) What changed is the danger zone around them: the pool of blocked Cuban persons expanded sharply, and a payment that reaches a designated person — or a foreign bank that facilitates one — is now exposed. Steering clear means screening every party against the expanded designations and keeping the recipient a genuinely independent private-sector entrepreneur — never a designated, state, GAESA/MININT/MINFAR, or 50%+-blocked-owned counterparty (OFAC's 50 Percent Rule). Screen with QvaPay Sentinel and structure with OFAC counsel.
On September 29, 2026 OFAC published — effective September 30, 2026 — the first CACR amendment since May 2024, implementing NSPM-5 (FR Doc. 2026-19973), plus new Cuba Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 516, implementing E.O. 14404 (FR Doc. 2026-19977), five new FAQs (1271–1275) and an OFAC Alert, “Expanded Sanctions Against Cuba”.
- Restricted List: §515.209 now prohibits indirect as well as direct financial transactions with any Cuba Restricted List entity — acting as an intermediary in a transfer where a listed entity is originator or beneficiary — and §515.201(c) adds an anti-evasion prohibition. Eighteen general licenses were conformed to exclude indirect Restricted List transactions, including §515.574, §515.578 and §515.584 (FAQ 1271).
- Banking: the “U-turn” license (§515.584(d)) is withdrawn — U.S. banks may now only reject such transfers (FAQ 1272). The §515.584(h)(2) license for accounts held solely by an independent private-sector entrepreneur is withdrawn; banks must block existing accounts and need a specific license to unblock them (FAQ 1273). §515.584(h) survives only for accounts that receive U.S. payments for authorized transactions and remit them to Cuba.
- Travel: the professional-meetings license (§515.564(a)(2)) is eliminated, with a wind-down to October 30, 2026 (FAQ 1275); group people-to-people travel (§515.565(b)) is removed, and other educational travel must run under a U.S. sponsor with an accompanying representative, except accredited degree-granting institutions (FAQ 1274). Trips with a completed booking before September 30 are grandfathered.
What did not change: §515.570 remittances (including (g)(3); only the student-remittance paragraph (d) was reworded) and §515.582 import-tied payments were not amended, and family remittances and authorized humanitarian activity continue. What the amendment removes is the bank-account lane for Cuban businesses. This site's support flows describe payment services in and out for permitted fund flows — never bank accounts for Cuban businesses — the basis OFAC itself reaffirmed on September 29 in FAQ 756: online payment platforms may facilitate or process authorized transactions as transactions ordinarily incident under §515.421 — and every payment path must now be screened for an indirect Restricted List link, not only the counterparty. Commentary: historian Michael J. Bustamante notes the 2024 account license “never got off the ground” because banks never received KYC guidance, so its withdrawal is largely signaling. Full write-up and press survey: the September 30, 2026 rule →
What still works, and how QvaPay runs it: what closed, and QvaPay’s answer →
1 · The U.S. side (sanctions law)
The embargo baseline is the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515): for a U.S. person, transactions with Cuba are prohibited unless authorized, and §515.201(c) independently bans structuring around the rules. A narrow set of general licenses opens a private-sector lane.
- ✓Remittances under §515.570 — including (g)(3) remittances to support private-business development and non-state activity by independent private sector entrepreneurs (§515.340), plus family/donative remittances with their own limits.
- ✓Importing certain goods & services from independent entrepreneurs — everything except the categories the State Department's §515.582 List excludes — and payments necessary to those imports, with documentary proof of independent status. (Fed. Reg. 2024-11618)
- ✓Internet-based services (§515.578) and mail/telecommunications transactions (§515.542) — not a general “payment platform” license.
- ✓U.S. exports to the independent private sector for its own economic activity, and the payment for them (§515.533 + BIS License Exception SCP §740.21(b)(1), subject to BIS's 4 March 2026 suspension condition).
- ✕Equity in any Cuban enterprise. No general license authorizes it — it would need a specific OFAC license.
- ✕U.S. bank accounts for Cuban entrepreneurs. OFAC withdrew the §515.584(h)(2) license effective September 30, 2026; banks must block existing accounts (OFAC FAQ 1273). “U-turn” transfers (§515.584(d)) may now only be rejected (FAQ 1272).
- ✕Paying a "prohibited" Cuban. The recipient must be a genuinely independent entrepreneur; prohibited Government of Cuba officials (§515.337) and prohibited members of the Communist Party — the Politburo (§515.338) — are ineligible — and NSPM-5 (2025) directed OFAC to broaden that class.
- ✕Any transaction with GAESA / Restricted-List / SDN entities. GAESA has been on the Cuba Restricted List since 2017 and the OFAC SDN List since December 21, 2020.
- ✕Lodging at a Prohibited Accommodations List hotel; any confiscated-property nexus → Helms-Burton Title III treble-damages liability (Title III suits have been allowed since 2019); Title IV visa bars.
- ✕Payments or inducements to Cuban officials — FCPA plus sanctions exposure.
2 · On the ground in Cuba (Cuban law)
Foreign investment is governed by Law No. 118 of 2014 (amended by Decreto-Ley 128/2026) and its regulation, Decreto 325 (re-plumbed by Decreto 153/2026). Cuban law lets foreigners invest — but only through an approved Cuban counterparty in an approved project: historically the state, and since Decreto-Ley 133/2026 also a private firm as the Cuban party — never by quietly buying a state asset or a private shop.
- ✓Foreign investment through three forms: a joint venture (empresa mixta), an international economic association contract (AEI), or a wholly-foreign-owned enterprise. (Ley 118)
- ✓In all sectors except health & education for the population and the armed forces (bar their enterprise systems).
- ✓Repatriate profits freely abroad in convertible currency, with no transfer tax.
- ✓Protection from expropriation except declared public-utility, with indemnification at commercial value in convertible currency.
- ✓Up to 100% foreign ownership inside the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZED Mariel).
- ✓Operate private MIPYMEs — and, from 9 September 2026, private enterprises above 100 workers (Decreto-Ley 133/2026). The U.S. definition in §515.340 still stops at 100.
- ✕Buying a Cuban state asset outright. State-asset deals must be approved by the state (MINCEX → Council of Ministers, or delegated ministry heads) and fit the Cartera de Oportunidades portfolio.
- ✕Investing in health/education-to-population or the armed forces' sectors.
- ✕Foreign/diaspora equity — now written into Cuban law, still closed to U.S. persons. Decreto-Ley 133/2026 (in force 9 September 2026) lets Cubans abroad and foreign permanent residents of Cuba hold stakes in a private firm, and lets the firm associate with foreign capital only through Law 118's joint ventures and association contracts — but none of that helps a U.S. person, who still can't take equity under OFAC without a specific license. Treat as counsel-required.
- ✕Routing money through the military conglomerate GAESA and its arms (CIMEX, Gaviota, FINCIMEX, Almacenes Universales) — which control ports, tourism, retail and the remittance rails.
Eligibility definition & authorizing GLs
§515.340 is a definition, not a license. The general licenses below each have a distinct scope — remittances, import-tied payments, internet/telecom. Read the relevance notes; do not fuse them into “pay any MIPYME.”
What changed in 2025–2026
Both regimes are moving fast. Reform Watch tracks the Cuban-side policy in depth — see Reform Watch. The dated milestones below are the ones that change what's legal.
- 2020-12-21GAESA designated on the OFAC SDN List (it had been on the State Department's Cuba Restricted List since November 2017)
- 2024-05-29CACR amendments effective — 515.340 redefines 'independent private sector entrepreneur'; expanded private-sector general licenses
- 2025-06-30NSPM-5 reissues the Trump-era hard-line Cuba memorandum: escalates pressure on the government, reaffirms the statutory ban on tourism, directs OFAC/Commerce to tighten the CACR, and directs OFAC to broaden the 'prohibited Government of Cuba officials' definition — which would narrow who counts as an eligible independent entrepreneur. Biden-era private-sector general licenses (remittances, U-Turn) remain in effect only until OFAC amends the regulations — which it did on September 30, 2026, withdrawing the U-turn and entrepreneur-account licenses while leaving §515.570 and §515.582 in place.
- 2025-07-14First State Department additions to the Cuba Restricted List and Prohibited Accommodations List under NSPM-5 take effect (more military-linked hotels barred).
- 2026-01-29E.O. 14380, 'Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba' (91 FR 5085), escalates U.S. pressure on the Cuban government.
- 2026-03-04BIS suspends License Exception SCP §740.21(b)(1) — U.S. exports for the Cuban private sector's own economic activity — for any transaction involving the deposit of foreign funds into a Cuban-owned bank; payment paths that never touch a Cuban bank keep the exception, and the §740.21(b)(2) personal-use lane is unaffected (guidance under EAR §740.2(b); no Federal Register document).
- 2026-03–05Cuban Gazette / implementing measures discussed diaspora and foreign capital in the private economy — MIPYME-specific equity mechanics stayed unsettled until Decreto-Ley 133/2026 (2 September, below); none of it creates a U.S.-person OFAC equity license
- 2026-05-01E.O. 14404 (91 FR 25061) creates an IEEPA-based Cuba secondary-sanctions program on top of the CACR: blocking of persons designated for operating in the energy, defense, metals-and-mining, financial-services or security sectors, or owned/controlled by the Government of Cuba; §2(b) preserves Part 515-authorized activity, so the private-sector general licenses survive.
- 2026-06-18National Assembly approves ~176-measure reform package — scraps the state-JV requirement, authorizes private banks, opens foreign/diaspora equity in state & large private firms, lifts the 100-employee cap, allows direct private import/export (Cuban law; does not create a U.S.-person equity license)
- 2026-07-23State Department E.O. 14404 designations, added to OFAC's SDN list, include Terminal de Contenedores de Mariel S.A. and Coral Marítima S.A. — citing a mid-June 2026 port transfer as GAESA-linked sanctions evasion (OFAC recent actions 2026-07-23).
- 2026-08-20State Department and OFAC designate three ICAP officials and nine state entities under E.O. 14404, spanning metals and mining (Empresa de Niquel Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara, METALCUBA, ACINOX Comercial, GEOMINSAL), construction (Ministry of Construction), imports and logistics (TRANSIMPORT, CONSUMIMPORT), tourism supply (CORATUR) and labor contracting (ACOREC).
- 2026-08-25Presidential Determination 2026-21 (signed 20 August, 91 FR 54935) continues Trading With the Enemy Act authorities with respect to Cuba for one year, until 14 September 2027, as implemented by the CACR.
- 2026-09-02Decreto-Ley 133/2026 published (Gaceta Oficial No. 71; in force 9 September): abolishes the 100-worker cap on private firms; Art. 54(a) lets Cubans resident abroad and foreigners with permanent residence in Cuba be partners; Art. 9(i) lets a private firm associate with foreign capital under Law 118. Cuban law only — 31 CFR §515.340 still stops at 100 employees, and no U.S. general license lets a U.S. person take equity.
- 2026-09-03State Department and OFAC designate Banco Exterior de Cuba (financial services), COMERCIAL CUPET S.A. and ABAPET (energy), NICAROTEC and CEXNI (metals and mining), and one Castro family member under E.O. 14404; the same action issued Cuba General License 4A for third-country diplomatic and consular missions.
- 2026-09-17State Department designates eight entities and three individuals under E.O. 14404: four nickel-sector enterprises at Moa and Nicaro (SERCONI, CEPRONIQUEL, CEDINIQ, Pinares S.A.) and four FAR military research and production enterprises (SIMPRO, CIDNAV, CIDAI, GELCOM) with three of their directors general.
- 2026-09-30OFAC's CACR amendment takes effect (FR Doc. 2026-19973): §515.209 now bars indirect as well as direct financial transactions with Cuba Restricted List entities, with a new anti-evasion clause at §515.201(c); the 'U-turn' license at §515.584(d) is withdrawn (banks may only reject such transfers); the §515.584(h)(2) license for U.S. bank accounts held solely by an independent private-sector entrepreneur is withdrawn and existing accounts must be blocked (FAQ 1273); the professional-meetings license (§515.564(a)(2)) and group people-to-people travel (§515.565(b)) are eliminated and educational travel narrowed. §515.582 import-tied payments are not amended; §515.570 remittances stand, with only paragraph (d), on remittances to students, reworded. The same day OFAC issued the Cuba Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 516, implementing E.O. 14404.
3 · The only lane today
Put the two regimes together and one framed path survives for U.S. persons: remittance/support to independent private sector entrepreneurs under the applicable CACR rules (notably §515.570(g)(3)), with eligibility under §515.340, SDN/CRL screening, a rail that doesn't run on Cuban state-bank or regime-processor rails, and no confiscated-property nexus — often using a sanctions-aware peer-to-peer rail such as QvaPay, whose independent Cuban P2P forex traders complete the CUP/MLC ↔ QUSD conversion leg. Not equity, not state assets, not a determination that any transfer is authorized. See how support works and how QvaPay does it, the compliance posture, and the OFAC FAQ on digital entrepreneurs in Cuba (open interpretive questions plus our responses).
- • How MINCEX applies Law 118's approval pipeline when the Cuban party is a private firm (permitted by DL 133 Art. 9(i), which took effect 9 September 2026).
- • How the SDN/secondary-sanctions reach on GAESA and state entities interacts with the CACR private-sector GLs.
- • Helms-Burton Title III exposure for any asset with a confiscation history.
- • Securities-law treatment of any pooled vehicle, even one limited to remittance/payment support.
Confidence: Cuban-law and core OFAC statements above are drawn from primary sources (MINCEX/Ley 118, Gaceta Oficial, Federal Register 2024-11618, OFAC FAQs) and were adversarially verified; Helms-Burton and sanctions secondary-effects statements rest on named law-firm analyses and the ingested OFAC corpus and are not individually court-confirmed here. See Data & methodology. This is research, not legal advice — stand up any structure only with OFAC sanctions counsel and securities counsel.
Common questions
What U.S. laws govern dealings with Cuba?+
Chiefly the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR Part 515), enforced by OFAC, and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act (Titles III and IV). Together they broadly prohibit U.S. persons from investing in Cuba.
What is allowed today?+
Scoped CACR authorizations: remittances under §515.570 (including (g)(3) private-sector support), import-tied payments under §515.582, certain travel categories, internet/telecom services, and humanitarian/donative remittances — never equity, and never dealings with Cuba Restricted List entities. Nothing on this site authorizes a specific transfer.
Can a president lift the Cuba embargo?+
Core embargo provisions, including Helms-Burton, were codified by Congress in 1996, so fully lifting the embargo requires Congress. A president can ease or tighten specific regulations within that framework.